



Position Paper

United Nations Security Council

Agenda- War situations between China and India, along with the consequences if the war breaks out

Portfolio- People's Republic of China

Decades of negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing have not yielded a solution to their competing claims over 135,000 square kilometres of territory along the border. Even so, violence of the kind witnessed on June 15, when 20 Indian soldiers and a large number of Chinese soldiers died in a brutal clash in the remote Galwan River Valley, is rare. The tensions at the Line of Actual Control have been making headlines for more than a month now despite the coronavirus crisis dominating the news cycle.

An increase in tensions along the disputed border between India and China represents a potential watershed for Asia's two largest powers. India and China each appear to have interpreted the bloodshed as stemming from 'unilateral' changes in the other side's understanding of the border, as evidenced by patrols 'crossing' the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as the border is known.

Chinese claims for land in LAC

Chinese officials have not disclosed a motive for their own actions in the area. They have suggested that the 15 June incident originated in the indiscipline of local Indian troops. More generally, China criticised India's August 2019 change to the status of Kashmir, and there has been discussion in the country's state-controlled media of India's growing US ties and construction projects along the border. Perceiving that India is growing increasingly nationalistic, influential Chinese analysts accuse it of being blinded by false confidence, as well as displaying 'strategic aggressiveness'.

Another challenge arises from the need to manage the possibly inflated expectations of India's partners. India's stalled market reforms and, to some extent, its domestic majoritarian politics have dented the economic and normative pillars of many Western partnerships with India. Greater strategic convergence on China, or on the rules-based international order, may help to compensate for this. But even if India were to perceptibly adopt a harder line on

the South China Sea or Hong Kong, it would still seek to avoid over-committing to preserve its strategic autonomy.

Several areas in Ladakh and North Sikkim witnessed major military build-up by both the Indian and Chinese in the last few days, in a clear signal of escalating tension and hardening of respective positions by the two sides even two weeks after they were engaged in two separate face-offs.

Historical Wars

China has not taken any retaliatory measures in response to India's actions and a return to normal is in the best interests of both countries. Beijing has clearly stated that New Delhi's recent infrastructure enhancement was the primary driver of Chinese concerns. In a comprehensive interview on June 25 with Chinese ambassador to India, Sun Weidong, Sun notes that "The two sides basically have kept peace for decades. However, since the beginning of this year, the Indian side has continuously built facilities at or crossing the LAC in the Galwan Valley, constantly changing the status quo on ground control.

Beijing probably wants to offset Indian infrastructure improvements that might offer logistical advantages in the future. From this perspective, China's decision to occupy parts of Galwan Valley, according to recent imagery, may be designed to limit any tactical or strategic dividend India might receive from enhanced infrastructure near the LAC. Interestingly, China may have little choice in the matter. Although rarely discussed in Western circles, China probably lost its last standoff with India, referred to as the Nathu La and Cho La clashes, in 1967, and this predates the infrastructure upgrades that are set to give New Delhi potentially new military advantages. Contrary to conventional thinking, New Delhi may already have a leg up in certain respects.

India's strategic roads are not just roads with implications during wartime, but in peacetime they also support India's ability to patrol disputed areas. India has ramped up infrastructure on its side, so the Chinese military is finding Indian soldiers in locations where they are not used to seeing Indian footprint. Indian Army's patrolling is also more effective than in the past, forcing Chinese military to up the ante." Thus, Beijing would reasonably want to respond through consolidation of its territorial claims.

Article 370 and consequences for China

Western analysts to date have probably underestimated the significance of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision in August 6, 2019, to revoke Article 370 of the Indian constitution to unilaterally change the status of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh. For New Delhi, doing so should have been a non-factor since these are settled territories. For Beijing, however, the move seems to have struck a chord because it called into question Indian motives for Aksai Chin which borders Ladakh. Preeminent South Asia specialist Ashley Tellis raised the issue, writing: "...China's fierce opposition to the transformation of Ladakh's status, something that received only passing attention hitherto, set the stage of the militaristic power play that is now underway along the LAC." Tellis later added that Beijing believes New Delhi had been involved in "cartographic aggression," and as a result, he has been receiving "an earful" from Chinese interlocutors about it. On the same day as Modi's abrogation of Article 370, India's Home Minister, Amit Shah, vowed to give his life for the integrity of Jammu and Kashmir — to include Aksai Chin — further stoking Chinese concerns.

There is no doubt that countering Indian infrastructure development near the LAC played a crucial role in Beijing's decision-making. Additionally, Modi's decision on Article 370, though not considered a big deal in New Delhi, apparently rang alarm bells in Beijing. Of course, there could be other reasons that contributed to China's assertiveness along the LAC. None, however, support the notion that China was trying to exploit the coronavirus pandemic for geopolitical gain.

If anything, China expert Yun Sun reverses the causation, arguing that Beijing may have thought New Delhi's growing assertiveness at the LAC was nefariously timed to exploit China while it was trying to deal with deteriorating U.S. ties amid the coronavirus fallout. India had tried to stab it [China] in the back. Thus, Beijing had to respond forcefully. Even if this argument is to be believed, it still does not negate Chinese grievances about Indian moves at the border. Rather, it seems that Beijing would have responded militarily regardless, albeit perhaps without as much force and at a different time to

properly adjust what it saw as New Delhi's steady attempts to change the status quo on the ground.

United States-India and China

This time, the situation appears different. The consultations between the two sides are much more open, and the United States has publicly and repeatedly supported India. Even prior to the Galwan clash that resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian Army personnel, senior Indian and U.S. officials appear to have been in contact. The two sides discussed the state of bilateral defence ties and agreed to keep up with their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defence partnership. The readouts of the call did not mention China specifically but the statements issued by the U.S., which suggest they talked about the border stand-off. In mid-July as well, Singh and Esper held a conversation where they talked about bilateral defence cooperation and issues of mutual interest, which would likely have included China and the continuing border stand-off.

Followed a steady stream of comments from senior U.S. officials condemning the Chinese aggression while extending support to India. In one of the first statements, days after the June 15 clash, extend our deepest condolences to the people of India for the lives lost as a result of the recent confrontation with China.

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Security Council

The Security Council strongly deplores the three underground nuclear tests that India conducted on 11 May 1998, and the two further tests conducted on 13 May 1998 despite overwhelming international concern and protests. The Council strongly urges India to refrain from any further tests. It is of the view that such testing is contrary to the de facto moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

The Council also expresses its concern at the effects of this development on peace and stability in the region. The Council affirms the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The Council appeals to India, and all other States which have not yet done so, to become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay and without conditions.

The Council also encourages India to participate, in a positive spirit, in the proposed negotiations with other States for a fissile-material cut-off treaty in Geneva with a view to reaching early agreement. With a view to preventing an escalation in the arms race, in particular with regard to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and to preserving peace in the region, the Council urges States to exercise maximum restraint. The Council underlines the fact that the sources of tension in South Asia should be eliminated only through dialogue and not by military build-up.

Consequences if the war breaks out

- India can face another crisis after the outbreak of Covid-19 in the country.
- War will disturb the military and trade partnership between the countries.
- War will even disturb the trade route between the South and South-east Asian countries.
- The whole world can even enter into World War III; the biggest destruction of Earth.
- There will be great downfall in the economy of both countries and other countries affected by the war.
- There will be a huge impact on the international peace and security as well.

- There will be a impact on the population of the countries and can face issues like, unemployment, shelter, health care, sanitization and supply of food, as both the countries as the most populated countries in the world.

Conclusion

China claims about 90,000 square kilometres of territory in India's northeast, while India says China occupies 38,000 square kilometres of its territory in the Aksai Chin Plateau in the Himalayas, a contiguous part of the Ladakh region.

The issue is lot big and a major concern for both sides, as it can disturb all the trade cycles, military partnership. China is ready for the direct negotiations with India, but if India, don't want it China is also ready for war, as the land occupied by India, which is officially of China, is the major thought and China want it back in any circumstances. Warnings, given to India are a lot more, but Indian government only wants a violent faceoff and China not totally agreed with it, as can cause a major destruction.

The supply of weapons to the LAC border from India, and agreements with other countries, making all against China. Security Council must discuss about the problems, and seeing furthermore, the consequences if the war breaks out.

Sources:

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