Delegate’s name- Madhavi Shrimali

Delegation- Indonesia

Agenda: War situations between China and India, along with the consequences if the war breaks out.

HISTORY OF THE STARTING OF DETIORATION OF SINO-INDIA RELATIONS

 In 1950, the Chinese [People's Liberation Army](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Liberation_Army) [took control of Tibet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invasion_of_Tibet_%281950%E2%80%931951%29). Later the Chinese extended their influence by building a road in 1956–67 and placing border posts in Aksai Chin. India found out after the road was completed, protested against these moves and decided to look for a diplomatic solution to ensure a stable Sino-Indian border. To resolve any doubts about the Indian position, Prime Minister [Jawaharlal Nehru](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jawaharlal_Nehru) declared in parliament that India regarded the McMahon Line as its official border. The Chinese expressed no concern at this statement,and in 1961 and 1962, the government of China asserted that there were no frontier issues to be taken up with India.

In 1954, China and India negotiated the [Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Principles_of_Peaceful_Coexistence), by which the two nations agreed to abide in settling their disputes. India presented a frontier map which was accepted by China, and the slogan *Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai* was popular then. Nehru in 1958 had privately told [G. Parthasarathi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gopalaswami_Parthasarathy_%28diplomat%29), the Indian envoy to China not to trust the Chinese at all and send all communications directly to him, bypassing the Defence Minister [VK Krishna Menon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VK_Krishna_Menon) since his communist background clouded his thinking about China. According to [Georgia Tech](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgia_Institute_of_Technology) scholar John W Garver, Nehru's policy on Tibet was to create a strong Sino-Indian partnership which would be catalysed through agreement and compromise on Tibet. Garver believes that Nehru's previous actions had given him confidence that China would be ready to form an "Asian Axis" with India.

As a consequence of their non-recognition of the McMahon Line, China's maps showed both the North East Frontier Area (NEFA) and Aksai Chin to be Chinese territory. In 1960, Zhou Enlai unofficially suggested that India drop its claims to Aksai Chin in return for a Chinese withdrawal of claims over NEFA. Adhering to his stated position, Nehru believed that China did not have a legitimate claim over either of these territories, and thus was not ready to concede them. This adamant stance was perceived in China as Indian opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet. Nehru declined to conduct any negotiations on the boundary until Chinese troops withdrew from Aksai Chin, a position supported by the international community. India produced numerous reports on the negotiations, and translated Chinese reports into English to help inform the international debate. China believed that India was simply securing its claim lines in order to continue its "grand plans in Tibet".India's stance that China withdraw from Aksai Chin caused continual deterioration of the diplomatic situation to the point that internal forces were pressuring Nehru to take a military stance against China.

MAIN CAUSE OF THE WAR

The main cause of the war was a dispute over the sovereignty of the widely separated Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh border regions. Aksai Chin, claimed by India to belong to Kashmir and by China to be part of Xinjiang, contains an important road link that connects the Chinese regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. China’s construction of this road was one of the triggers of the conflict.

THE FORWARD POLICY

At the beginning of 1961, Nehru appointed General B.M. Kaul army chief. Kaul reorganized the general staff and removed the officers who had resisted the idea of patrolling in disputed areas, although Nehru still refused to increase military spending or otherwise prepare for war. In the summer of 1961, China began patrolling along the McMahon Line. They entered parts of Indian administered regions and much angered the Indians in doing so. The Chinese, however, did not believe they were intruding upon Indian territory. In response the Indians launched a policy of creating outposts behind the Chinese troops so as to cut off their supplies and force their return to China. According to the Home Minister in Delhi in February 4 1962:

Chinese motives

Two of the major factors leading up to China’s eventual conflicts with Indian troops were India’s stance on the disputed borders and perceived Indian subversion in Tibet. There was perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian efforts to undermine Chinese control of Tibet, Indian efforts which were perceived as having the objective of restoring the pre-1949 status quo ante of Tibet. The other was perceived need to punish and end perceived Indian aggression against Chinese territory along the border. John W Garver argues that the first perception was incorrect based on the state of the Indian military and polity in the 1960s. It was, nevertheless a major reason for China’s going to war. He argues that while the Chinese perceptions of Indian border actions were substantially accurate.

IF THE WAR BROKE OUT

The most recent clashes took place earlier this month. On May 5, Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed near the Pangong Tso lake in Ladakh. It is believed that the skirmish took place because the PLA had objected to Indian military patrols in the area. Most of these clashes apparently stem from differing assessments of the location of the so-called Line of Actual Control— the de facto international border. And then on May 9, in the Naku La region near Tibet, soldiers from both sides came to blows and threw stones at each other mostly in efforts to induce the Indian troops to move back from the areas they were patrolling. No arms were used but several dozen soldiers were injured, including a senior Indian officer who was required to be airlifted to a hospital.

After a long period of relative quiet along the Sino-Indian border, militarized incidents have come to the fore again. According to the Indian government, the Chinese military crossed into Indian territory, 1,025 times between 2016 and 2018. Given that China and India’s borders remain unmarked, such transgressions are likely rooted in how Beijing and New Delhi have different perceptions about the extent of their territories.

A war between the world’s largest Democracy and the world’s largest Communist state may not seem likely to the casual observer. But not only is it possible, it happened before. Only things were very different back then. China was facing an economic collapse in the early 1960s in the years following the Great Leap Forward. The country was struggling to feed its people, let alone support an all-out war. India, on the other hand, was on an economic upturn. Militarily, however, India was unprepared and could only field 14,000 troops, compared to China exhaustive man power.

 