



South India FairGaze

Inter-School Model United Nations 2023

Background Guide

United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Agenda: The Threat of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) Especially During War
Situations

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Greetings delegates,

Firstly, let me, on behalf of the Executive Board, begin by applauding you and your guides to encourage you to participate in this Model United Nations conference. For those who have discovered the fraternity for the first time, welcome, and to all the seasonal Munnors, I'd say it's obvious that the tug of debate has led you back to this arena on your journey towards becoming a global citizen! Each delegate's contribution will determine the effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council as a committee. Either way, I assure you that this Executive Board and the Secretariat has, and is going to, work tirelessly to ensure an exceptional experience.

This background guide is of greater importance than I could adequately express via words. I must emphasise that it has been read in all its glory and is thoroughly comprehended. I am conscious that most delegates rarely read background guides or pay it any regard. I, for one, have discovered myself a frequent member of the group. The objective or the content of this background guide, however, are by no means conventional.

In terms of content, it incorporates very little reliable factual information regarding IEDs and their associated impacts. A substantial number of guides will typically be along the lines of analysing IEDs, the most contemporary deliberation on the subject at hand, and an outline of their roots. But this guide primarily raises questions and ideas rather than merely provide facts. Although it contains an extensive quantity of knowledge that is factually relevant, the intent of this background guide is not to orient you with the facts you will need. The key objective of the content in this guide is to introduce the philosophical and academic debate surrounding the problems brought on by IEDs. A significant portion of this guide analyses, examines, and critically assesses the academic and intellectual viewpoints on the topic. Additionally, it aims at facilitating you to think strategically about the agenda and the issues it raises instead of simply providing you with a factual understanding of the status quo (your research ought to facilitate that). Therefore, you must read this guide with the intention of reading it as an academic publication in lieu of as a guide. This guide fulfils the same objective as the discussions themselves in terms of intent. IEDs is an intriguing subject that can lead to many diversions. In the context of international humanitarian law, this guide analyses the existence or absence of IEDs.

This committee's goal must be to immediately address the concerns mentioned in this guide with a cerebral and academic approach, not only a pragmatic one. This agenda places a strong emphasis on theory and theorising. Of course, it is perilous for law to distinguish between theory and conduct, but it is equally problematic for theory to be informed by practicalities. Theory should be developed with an intellectual and academic foundation that enables it to fit within the larger legal framework, while also keeping a close eye on practicality.

More than its executive board, a committee is defined by its delegates. You, the participating delegates, determine how the proceedings play out. Therefore, you must be ready to engage in an enlightening experience. Delegates should be familiar with their nation's historical background and present international relations and global political situation in addition to the research on the agenda. A clear foreign policy and representatives from the governments of the delegates' home nations should be brought to the committee. The participants must be well-versed in diplomatic protocol in addition to conducting research related to the agenda items and the committee's mandate. The notion of diplomacy can be used to determine what constitutes general diplomatic behaviour. Diplomatic conduct can also be country-specific.

I am wholeheartedly conscious that a number of the demands I have made in this letter may be challenging to comprehend precisely (even though precise comprehension is crucial), and that some of the topics in this guide may be difficult to interpret and critically consider. I place tremendous importance on the committee members having a critical and intellectual comprehension of the talks in the background guide and the agenda. In light of this, I fervently implore and advise you to write to either the Vice-Chairperson or I (the Chairperson), as often as necessary, with any important queries or topics for debate pertaining to the agenda's substance, both within and outside of the Background Guide.

At the conference, I'm truly looking forward to interacting with you. As a final note of caution, please peruse every word of this guide carefully and get in correspondence with us if you have any questions.

All the Best!

The Executive Board

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Chairperson

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COMMITTEE HISTORY AND MANDATE

One of the United Nations six main bodies, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is in charge of safeguarding global security and peace, proposing new UN members for inclusion to the General Assembly, and approving any amendments to the UN Charter.

It has the authority to impose international sanctions, launch military operations, and form peacekeeping missions. The only UN body with the power to impose legally binding resolutions on member nations is the UNSC.

Each of its fifteen members has one vote. According to the United Nations Charter, all Members are required to abide with Council decisions.

Five of the fifteen members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—are permanent members.

Any substantive Security Council resolution is subject to the veto (blocking) power of the permanent members. This veto power does not apply to any votes or matters that come before the General Assembly or emergency special sessions of the General Assembly. The remaining ten members are chosen regionally and serve two-year terms. The group's members alternate monthly holding the presidency.

When determining whether there is a violation or imminent danger to the peace, the Security Council is in charge. It suggests ways of altering the terms of settlement and encourages parties to a conflict to settle it peacefully. The Security Council occasionally has the option of using sanctions or even approving the use of force in order to preserve or restore global peace and security.

Article 30 of the Charter stipulates that the Security Council shall adopt its own rules of procedure, and in 1946, the council adopted its Provisional Rules of Procedure(S/96). Subsequently, the Provisional Rules of Procedure were modified on several occasions; the last revision was made in 1982(S/96/Rev.7) in order to add Arabic as the sixth official language, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 35/219 of 17 December 1980.

Under the United Nations Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council are:

- to maintain international peace and security in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations;
- to investigate any dispute or situation which might lead to international friction;

- to recommend methods of adjusting such disputes or the terms of settlement;
- to formulate plans for the establishment of a system to regulate armaments;
- to determine the existence of a threat to the peace or act of aggression and to recommend what action should be taken;
- to call on Members to apply economic sanctions and other measures not involving the use of force to prevent or stop aggression;
- to take military action against an aggressor;
- to recommend the admission of new Members;
- to exercise the trusteeship functions of the United Nations in "strategic areas";
- to recommend to the General Assembly the appointment of the Secretary-General and, together with the Assembly, to elect the Judges of the International Court of Justice.

Mandate:

The United Nations Charter established six main organs of the United Nations, including the Security Council. It gives primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security to the Security Council, which may meet whenever peace is threatened.

According to the Charter, the United Nations has four purposes:

- to maintain international peace and security;
- to develop friendly relations among nations;
- to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights;
- and to be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations.

All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

When a complaint concerning a threat to peace is brought before it, the Council's first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:

- set forth principles for such an agreement;
- undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- dispatch a mission;

- appoint special envoys; or
- request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

- issue ceasefire directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
- dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

- economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
- severance of diplomatic relations;
- blockade;
- or even collective military action.

The primary goal is to aim at those liable for the international community's condemned policies or practices while minimising the repercussions of the actions taken on other segments of the population and the economy.

Delegates are requested to visit the given link for more information on UNSC and its work:

<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/>

EVIDENCE IN COMMITTEE

Evidence or proof is from the following sources will be accepted as credible in the committee:

1. News Resources:

- a. Reuters (<https://www.reuters.com/>)
Any Reuters' article that explicitly mentions the fact mentioned or contradicts the fact mentioned by another delegate in council may be cited to support claims made in the committee.
- b. State operated News Agencies
The State that owns the News Agency may benefit or fall victim by these revelations. These reports may be used to advocate for or against any nation as a whole if they are reliable or substantial enough, but in that case, any other member of the council may refute them.

Some examples are:

- i. Russia: RIA Novosti (<http://en.rian.ru/>)
- ii. Iran: RNAI (<https://www.irna.ir/>)
- iii. China: Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (<http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/>)

2. Government Reports:

These narratives can be used in a manner similar to that of State Operated News Agencies and can be perpetually refuted by another nation. The Executive Board, however, may nevertheless consider a report as reliable information notwithstanding a given country's denial of it.

Some examples are:

- a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America (<http://www.state.gov/>) or the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (<http://www.eng.mil.ru/>).
- b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (<http://www.mea.gov.in/>) or People's Republic of China (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/>).

- c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports (<http://www.un.org/>).
- d. Multilateral Organisations like NATO (<http://www.nato.int/>), ASEAN (<http://www.aseansec.org/>), OPEC (<http://www.opec.org/>), etc.

3. UN Reports:

For the Executive Board, all UN Reports are regarded as reliable sources of information or proof.

- a. UN Bodies like the UNSC (<http://www.un.org/>) or UNGA (<http://www.un.org/>).
- b. UN Affiliated bodies like the International Atomic Energy Agency (<http://www.iaea.org/>), World Bank (<http://www.worldbank.org/>), International Monetary Fund (<http://www.imf.org/>), International Committee of the Red Cross (<http://www.icrc.org/>), etc.
- c. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System (<http://www.ats.aq/>), the International Criminal Court (<http://www.icccpi.int/>).

NOTE:

Under no circumstances will sources like Wikipedia, Amnesty International, or newspapers like the Times of India, etc. be accepted as PROOF/EVIDENCE. But if the material provided in such sources is in line with the beliefs of a Government, they can be used to gain a better understanding of any topic or even be brought up in discussion.

INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA

An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating explosive material, destructive, lethal, noxious, incendiary, pyrotechnic materials or chemicals designed to destroy, disfigure, distract or harass. They may incorporate military stores but are normally devised from non-military components.

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) are certainly more than just a modern phenomenon, they also pose a grave threat to the future of conventional warfare. Any advancement in IEDs and its application requires an extension of the law for it is nearly impossible for any matter to exist in a legal vacuum. In order to adequately address the threats posed by IEDs, it is crucial to first grasp their nature—a process that is especially novel and demanding.

Due to the wide array of tactics available for their creation, dispersion, and initiation, IEDs are extremely versatile weapons. With regard to their versatility, they are capable of helping rapidly counteract opponents' strategies and countermeasures as well as changes in the availability of the raw materials used in their creation.

IEDs are a preferred weapon of choice for some threat actors who use them to either attack more powerful and well-equipped security forces (often with indiscriminate effects on the civilian population) or to directly target civilians (including the United Nations). This is due to IEDs' versatility, adaptability, simplicity, and low cost of manufacture.

In asymmetrical conflict, where one side has a large military advantage over the other, IEDs are frequently deployed. To level up the odds in these instances, the weaker side frequently turns to unusual strategies like the use of IEDs. IEDs are challenging to locate and endure against since they can be remotely or locally triggered.

IEDs have the potential to severely jeopardise the target's physical and mental health. IEDs can cause injury or death to civilians as well as soldiers, and individuals residing in combat zones may experience mental health effects as a result of their fear of these weapons.

In order to combat the threat posed by IEDs, military forces have devised countermeasures such as specialised vehicles and equipment aimed at identifying and neutralising IEDs safely. The detection and avoidance of IEDs in battlefields is a key component of regimens of instruction for soldiers.

IEDs can be employed in a variety of parameters, notably terrorism and illicit activities, despite the fact that war is the situation with which they are most typically associated.

IEDs are a severe hazard and ought to be addressed seriously and dealt with using appropriate methods no matter the circumstance.

HISTORY OF THE AGENDA

Despite being aware that the proliferation of IEDs has substantially developed of late, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have long posed a hazard in times of war. Any explosive device that is not produced by a reputable military or civilian source is referred to as an "IED."

IEDs have been used in conflicts throughout history by a variety of parties, but during the early 2000s, the Middle East witnessed a surge in the use of IEDs. IEDs, for instance, were to blame for a sizable portion of coalition forces' losses during the Iraq War.

Insurgent groups and other non-state actors have found success employing IEDs in combat scenarios. They can be installed in strategic areas and used to assault military convoys, patrols, and other targets given that they are remarkably simple to build and conceal. IEDs additionally have a tremendous psychological impact as well because the prospect of an attack may render civilians apprehensive and hinder overall military operations.

Military forces have come up with an array of countermeasures in response to the threat posed by IEDs. Furthermore to training programmes that aid soldiers in recognising and mitigating IEDs in the field, they include specialised vehicles and equipment created to detect and neutralise IEDs.

IEDs persist as a grave threat in instances of war despite efforts to alleviate their menace. For instance, the Taliban and other insurgent organisations have continued to utilise IEDs in the lasting conflict in Afghanistan. As a result, military forces engaged in combat across the world are bound to continue to be concerned about the threat posed by IEDs.

IEDs under the current international humanitarian legal instruments

1. CCW Amended Protocol II

With the exception of anti-personnel mines, CCW Amended Protocol II controls IEDs as a class of weaponry, which includes both command-detonated and victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are classified as "other devices" in CCW Amended Protocol II, which are "manually-placed munitions and devices... designed to kill, injure, or damage and which are actuated manually, by remote control, or automatically after a lapse of time."

The Ottawa Convention continues to grow progressively more universal, but CCW Amended Protocol II defies this trend by not distinguishing between IEDs that are detonated by victims and IEDs that are detonated on command. IEDs and booby-traps, which, if rendered with explosives, are victim-activated IEDs, are exempt from two requirements for AP mines under CCW Amended Protocol II: detectability and monitoring when established by hand.

It would be unreasonable to demand victim-activated IEDs, including booby-traps, to comply with laws regarding detectability and monitoring. IEDs that are devoid of any metal or are loaded with coffee to fool explosive-sniffing dogs are prominent instances of disparate IEDs.

It would also be unrealistic to protect and keep an eye on perimeter-marked areas for victim-activated IEDs, as guerrilla fighters are frequently on the move.

Conversely, state parties that desire to distinguish AP mines from booby traps may object to a complete ban on victim-activated IEDs, despite the fact that it has been noted that booby traps are difficult to distinguish from improvised landmines.

IEDs that were allegedly fabricated out of soda cans, candy boxes, or footballs could be distinguished from homemade landmines and booby traps.

Given their potential for being indiscriminate by nature, command-detonated IEDs may be subject to the same requirements of detection and oversight as victim-activated IEDs. It's possible that victim-activated IED regulations, which place more constraints on the former, are not entirely genuine. Since both victim detonated and command-detonated IEDs have a similar manufacturing process, the command-detonated IEDs might be simply converted to victim-activated mode. It is stated that NSAs, who employ IEDs frequently, are capable of using command-detonated IEDs, therefore it is assumed that they are also capable of using victim-activated IEDs, which typically require a simpler technique.

Additionally, IEDs that were inadvertently detonated could endanger civilians. It is impossible to overstate how safe other command detonation methods, such as remote control and time delay, are because IEDs manufactured by hand may become unstable, posing serious risks to bystanders. Civilians suffered injuries by the unsuccessful homemade grenades that a Nepalese armed group left behind. However, realistic constraints on command-detonated IEDs would focus more on strengthening the discrimination law, shielding civilians from military strikes, than on enforcing the regulations of detectability and surveillance. Using IEDs that were controlled to detonate, Iraqi rebels have assaulted residential neighbourhoods and popular markets.

The two major obstacles to strengthening the anti-discrimination law would be how to persuade NSAs to abide by international humanitarian law and how to deal with armed groups that do not fall under the definition of NSAs as defined by that law. Despite the fact that CCW Amended protocol II covers internal disputes, it lacks a mechanism to promote NSA adherence to the agreement. Regarding NSA compliance with the Ottawa Convention, the Geneva Call, an international humanitarian NGO that works to encourage NSA compliance with the AP mine prohibition and uphold humanitarian standards, created the Deed of Commitment to include non-state armed groups in the Ottawa Convention.

The subsequent problem is that some armed organisations are not subject to customary international humanitarian law since they do not meet the requirements to be parties to an internal armed conflict. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which mandates the minimally humane treatment of non-combatants in internal armed conflicts, has the following criteria that have been established through custom: the existence of an identifiable military group with organisation, structure, and chain of command, as well as the existence of a minimal level of intensity in conflict. Some armed groups function as rather decentralised factions with ill-defined leadership structures and no formal means of punishment for members who break humanitarian law. They commit terrorist activities without having any obvious military or political objectives.

The Iraqi militants in the ongoing conflict there since 2003 are the most illustrative example. Armed operations were haphazard activities meant more to incite widespread terror, which is not covered by common Article 3, than to accomplish a military goal.

The Anti-Terrorist Law of 2005 and domestic criminal law may apply to terrorist acts committed by armed groups that are not designated as NSAs, as they did in Iraq.

CASE STUDIES

The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been prevalent in some of the worst wars in recent history. Here are a few examples:

1. **Iraq War (2003-2011):**

IEDs were heavily utilised by a number of rebel groups throughout the Iraq War, most notably by the Sunni Islamist organisation al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). IEDs were used to attack civilians, coalition troops, and Iraqi security personnel, resulting in substantial casualties and property damage.

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/05/15/reflections-iraq-2003-witnessing-history-documenting-civilian-harm>

2. **Afghanistan War (2001-present):**

The Taliban and other insurgent entities have continued to deploy IEDs during the continuing battle in Afghanistan. IEDs have been employed to assault Afghan security forces, coalition soldiers, and civilians, resulting in heavy deaths and disruption.

<https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/war-afghanistan>

3. **Syrian Civil War (2011-present):**

IEDs proved to be widely exploited amid the Syrian Civil War by an assortment of organisations, including the Syrian government, the opposition, and radical organisations like ISIS. Targeting civilian and military objectives with IEDs has resulted in significant fatalities and damage.

<https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mideast-crisis-usa-idUKKBN13J27G>

4. **Yemeni Civil War (2015-present):**

IEDs have been systematically employed by Houthi rebels and other corporations during the Yemeni Civil War. Striking military and civilian objectives with IEDs has culminated in notable deaths and disruption.

<https://www.undp.org/yemen/stories/yemens-landmines-involuntary-displacement-and-untold-suffering>

5. **Russia-Ukraine Conflict (2014-present):**

In the ongoing confrontation between Russia and Ukraine, which commenced in

2014, the deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been widespread. IEDs have been utilised as a tactic of warfare by both sides, resulting in serious casualties and devastation.

Particularly noteworthy has been the use of IEDs by separatist organisations in Ukraine that are suspected to be supported by Russia. IEDs have been used by separatist organisations to attack Ukrainian military convoys, patrols, and other targets. Significant casualties have been sustained by both civilians and the Ukrainian army as a result of these attacks.

In response, the Ukrainian military has created a selection of countermeasures, including specialised equipment and vehicles as well as training programmes for soldiers, to identify and neutralise IEDs.

IED use in the conflict has also been charged against the Russian military. In accordance with a 2018 report by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), separatists supported by Russia deployed IEDs to attack OSCE monitors in eastern Ukraine.

The extensive number of victims and the continued instability in the region are results of the usage of IEDs in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. IEDs continue to pose a serious hazard, alarming both sides of the fight.

[\(https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-continue-use-ieds-inflct-casualties-says-uk-intelligence-2022-04-09/\)](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-forces-continue-use-ieds-inflct-casualties-says-uk-intelligence-2022-04-09/)

6. Burkina Faso Conflict (2015-present):

This case study investigates the aftermath of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Burkina Faso, emphasising on a particular incident in April 2022 where a military convoy encountered an assault resulting in fatalities and vehicle destruction. IED prevalence is influenced by a number of factors, including porous borders, spillover from neighbouring nations, and socioeconomic difficulties. The attacks have severely compromised security, rendered it difficult to respond effectively, and created apprehension. The deployment of mine action programmes, improved border restrictions, and intelligence sharing are all examples of countermeasures. Large geographic areas, a lack of resources, and adaptable insurgency groups are impediments. To reduce the threat of IEDs and advance long-lasting peace, future measures should give priority to regional cooperation, intelligence capabilities, and community involvement.

[\(https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/6/dozens-civilians-killed-in-burkina-faso-blast-ied-convoy-blast\)](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/6/dozens-civilians-killed-in-burkina-faso-blast-ied-convoy-blast)

CONCLUSION

Though not typical in terms of a broad background guide, I hope that this background guide was intriguing and thought-provoking to pursue. This background guide was not intended to serve as a factual introduction. It was an intellectual approach. Model UN discussions are frequently reduced to sterile arguments for the status quo. However, model UNs must strive to create a shared future rather than discuss the present. To achieve this, it is essential to consider the agenda from an intellectual rather than a factual standpoint. “Why is that? What gaps are there? What are the intellectual strategies that might be able to fill in logical gaps?” The committee's goal must be to achieve this. The status of IEDs is more dubious than it is established. This background guide has examined various scepticisms, talked about how to address them, and critically assessed the outcomes. It is challenging to sum up all of the information in this handbook. You must therefore be familiar with and read the manual backwards. However, the next part has the most effective summation in the form of a conclusion.

Pay tremendous attention to it, and during the committee, devote an enormous amount of effort into fulfilling those responsibilities without digressing.

RESULTS THE COMMITTEE MUST STRIVE TO ACHIEVE

1. What are the potential risks and challenges associated with implementing the proposed course of action, and how will they be addressed?
2. What is the timeline for implementing the proposed course of action?
3. How will the proposed course of action take into account the safety of civilians and non-combatants in the war zone?
4. What is the scope and severity of the IED threat in the specific war situation being addressed?
5. What strategies and tactics have been employed so far to address the IED threat, and how effective have they been?
6. Who will be responsible for implementing the proposed course of action, and what resources will be required?
7. How will the proposed course of action be evaluated for its effectiveness?
8. What additional measures or resources are needed to address the IED threat effectively