

UNIC-Fair Gaze National
MUN-2023

Background
Guide

COMMITTEE-

THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY-DISEC

AGENDA:

**DISCUSSION ON THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALONG
WITH STRENGTHENING PARTNERSHIP OF DISARMAMENT.**

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

Congratulations on getting the opportunity to participate in UNIC-Fair Gaze National MUN 2023, a single day simulation.

To the veterans of MUN, we promise you a very enriching debate that you've never experienced before and to the newcomers, we are really excited to be a part of your maiden voyage.

As the world looks to come out of a rather 'depression' ridden economic environment and the world talks about a long standing 'power shift' to the east happening soon, the importance of our generation being 'ready enough' to accept various challenges that lie ahead of us can hardly be over stated.

What we desire from the delegates is not how experienced or articulate they are. Rather, we want to see how she/he can respect disparities and differences of opinion, work around these, while extending their own foreign policy so that it encompasses more of the others without compromising their own stand, thereby reaching a unanimously acceptable practical solution.

The following pages intend to guide you with the nuances of the agenda as well as the Committee.

The Guide chronologically touches upon all the relevant aspects and will lead to fruitful debate in the Committee. It will provide you with a bird's eye view of the gist of the issue.

However, it has to be noted that the background guide only contains certain basic information which may form the basis for the debate and your research.

You are the representative of your allotted portfolio, and we hope you put in wholehearted efforts to research and comprehensively grasp all important facets of the diverse agenda.

All the delegates should be prepared well in order to make the committee's direction and debate productive. After all, only then will you truly be able to

represent your portfolio in the best possible way.

We encourage you to go beyond this background guide and delve into the extremities of the agenda to further enhance your knowledge of a burning global issue. We wish you all the best in your preparations and look forward to seeing you at the Conference!

Warm Regards!

**Aditya Sahni, Chairperson UNGA
Ashmi, Vice Chairperson UNGA**

Danger of Nuclear weaponry and their disarmament measures.

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. The dangers from such weapons arise from their very existence. Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 13,400 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date. Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers, but achieving this goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge. Regional Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) have been established to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security. The United Nations has sought to eliminate such weapons ever since its establishment. The first resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1946 established a Commission to deal with problems related to the discovery of atomic energy among others. The Commission was to make proposals for, inter alia, the control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes. The resolution also decided that the Commission should make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” A number of multilateral treaties have since been established with the aim of preventing nuclear proliferation and testing, while promoting progress in nuclear disarmament. These include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty Banning

Nuclear Weapon Tests In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which was signed in 1996 but has yet to enter into force, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) , which will enter into force on 22 January 2021. A number of bilateral and plurilateral treaties and arrangements seek to reduce or eliminate certain categories of nuclear weapons, to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and their delivery vehicles. These range from several treaties between the United States of America and Russian Federation as well as various other initiatives, to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The United Nations Secretariat supports efforts aimed at the non-proliferation and total elimination of nuclear weapons. “Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament” considers nuclear weapons in the framework of “disarmament to save humanity.” In the agenda, the Secretary-General calls for resuming dialogue and negotiations for nuclear arms control and disarmament. He also supports extending the norms against nuclear weapons, and in that regard appeals to States that possess nuclear weapons to affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Finally, the agenda proposes preparing for a world free of nuclear weapons through a number of risk -reduction measures, including transparency in nuclear-weapon programmes, further reductions in all types of nuclear weapons, commitments not to introduce new and destabilizing types of nuclear weapons, including cruise missiles, reciprocal commitments for the non-use of nuclear weapons and reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines. To further the agenda, concrete actions are proposed.

SEP 26: INTERNATIONAL DAY FOR THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In 2013, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) declared September 26 to be the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Abolition Day). The aims of the day are to enhance public awareness about the threat posed to humanity by nuclear weapons and the necessity for their total elimination. The UNGA resolution establishing the day (UNGA Res 68 32) also calls for progress on a nuclear weapons convention – a global treaty involving the nuclear armed states in the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. September 26 is also the anniversary of the incident in 1983 when a nuclear war was almost launched due to malfunctions in the Soviet nuclear weapons early warning system, which erroneously detected a US ballistic missile attack against Moscow. The incident is graphically portrayed in the award winning docu-drama ‘The Man who Saved the World.’

Treaty on prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Introduction: By resolution 71/258, the General Assembly decided to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination. The Assembly encouraged all Member States to participate in the Conference, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) includes a comprehensive set of prohibitions on participating in any nuclear weapon activities. These include undertakings not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons. The Treaty also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and the provision of assistance to any State in the conduct of prohibited activities. States parties will be obliged to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control. The Treaty also obliges States parties to provide adequate assistance to individuals affected by the use or testing of nuclear weapons, as well as to take necessary and appropriate measure of environmental remediation in areas under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons was adopted by the Conference (by a vote of 122 States in favour, with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on 7 July 2017, and opened for signature by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 20 September 2017. Following the deposit with the Secretary-General of the 50th instrument of ratification or

accession of the Treaty on 24 October 2020, it entered into force on 22 January 2021 in accordance with its article 15 (1).

Background: The initiative to seek a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons is an outcome of the discourse centred on promoting greater awareness and understanding of the humanitarian consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons. In recent years, renewed interest in the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons was first manifested in the final document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In its conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions, the Conference expressed its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law. In 2012, expressing concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, the General Assembly adopted resolution 67/56 entitled “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations”. By this resolution, the Assembly established in 2013 an open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons and the opened working group reflected its discussion in its report (A/68/514). A series of three international conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, convened in 2013 and 2014 respectively in Norway, Mexico and Austria, sought to present a facts-based understanding of the short and longer-term effects of a nuclear weapon detonation. These conferences, which included participation by a large majority of States, the International Committee of the Red Cross and hundreds of representatives of nongovernmental organizations, principally

coordinated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), played an important role in building demand for urgent action to advance nuclear disarmament negotiations.

Role of United Nations: By its resolution 72/31 of 4 December 2017, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to render the necessary assistance and to provide such services as may be necessary to fulfil the tasks entrusted to him under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Under Article 19, the Secretary-General is designated as depository of the Treaty. He is also tasked with the transmission to the States Parties of declarations received pursuant to Article 2 of the Treaty and the convening of Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences (Article 8).

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Introduction: The NPT is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. The Treaty represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. Opened for signature in 1968, the Treaty entered into force in 1970. On 11 May 1995, the Treaty was extended indefinitely. A total of 191 States have joined the Treaty, including the five nuclear-weapon States. More countries have ratified the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the Treaty's significance. Importance The Treaty is regarded as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to further

the goals of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament, and to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between States parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Safeguards are used to verify compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all States parties, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use.

Case Study: Iran

The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the United States, in July 2015. Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars' worth of sanctions relief.

Proponents of the deal said that it would help prevent a revival of Iran's nuclear weapons program and thereby reduce the prospects for conflict between Iran and its regional rivals, including Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, the deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018. In retaliation for the U.S. departure and for deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including one by the United States, Iran has resumed its nuclear activities. UN

inspectors reported in early 2023 that Iran had enriched trace amounts of uranium to nearly weapons-grade levels, sparking international alarm.

President Joe Biden said the United States would return to the deal if Iran came back into compliance, and after two years of stop-and-go talks, the countries appear to be nearing an informal, interim agreement.

This nuclear deal was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231, adopted on July 20, 2015. The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions on Iran's civilian nuclear enrichment program.

At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1. The European Union also took part. The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran's nuclear program to the point that if Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one year, giving world powers time to respond.

Heading into the JCPOA negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a few months. Negotiating nations feared that Iran's moves to become a nuclear weapons state risked thrusting the region into a new crisis. One concern was that Israel would take preemptive military action against suspected nuclear facilities in Iran, as it had in Iraq and Syria, perhaps triggering reprisals by Lebanon-based Hezbollah or disruptions to the transport of oil in the Persian Gulf.

Additionally, Saudi Arabia has since signaled a willingness to obtain a nuclear weapon if Iran successfully detonates one.

Iran had previously agreed to forgo the development of nuclear weapons as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has been in force since 1970. However, after the [overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty](#) in 1979, Iranian leaders secretly pursued this technology. (In 2007, U.S. intelligence analysts concluded that Iran halted its work on nuclear weapons in 2003 but continued to acquire nuclear technology and expertise.)

Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years, offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment. After the 2013 election of President Hassan Rouhani, who was viewed as a reformer, the parties came to a preliminary agreement to guide negotiations for a comprehensive deal.

For its part, Iran sought the JCPOA for relief from international sanctions, which [starved its economy](#) [PDF] of more than \$100 billion in revenues in 2012–14 alone.

Does it prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons?

Many experts say that if all parties adhered to their pledges, the deal almost certainly could have achieved that goal for longer than a decade. Many of the [JCPOA's restrictions](#) on Iran's nuclear program have expiration dates. For example, after ten years (from January 2016), centrifuge restrictions would be lifted, and after fifteen years, so too

would limits on the amount of low-enriched uranium Iran can possess. Some of the deal's opponents faulted these so-called sunset provisions, saying they would only delay Iran building a bomb while sanctions relief would allow it to underwrite terrorism in the region.

What did Iran agree to?

Nuclear restrictions. Iran agreed not to produce either the highly enriched uranium or the plutonium that could be used in a nuclear weapon. It also took steps to ensure that its Fordow, Natanz, and Arak facilities pursued only civilian work, including medical and industrial research.

The accord limited the numbers and types of centrifuges Iran can operate, the level of its enrichment, as well as the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium. (Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235 isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope's concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear weapons.)

Monitoring and verification. Iran agreed to eventually implement a protocol that would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, unfettered access to its nuclear facilities and potentially to undeclared sites.

Inspections are intended to guard against the possibility that Iran develops

nuclear arms in secret, as it has allegedly attempted before. The IAEA has issued quarterly reports to its board of governors and the UN Security Council on Iran's implementation of its nuclear commitments.

A body known as the Joint Commission, which includes representatives of all the negotiating parties, monitors implementation of the agreement and resolves any disputes that arise. A majority vote by its members can gain IAEA inspectors access to suspicious, undeclared sites. The body also oversees the transfer of nuclear-related or dual-use materials.

What did the other signatories agree to?

Sanctions relief. The EU, United Nations, and United States all committed to lifting their nuclear-related sanctions on Iran. However, many other U.S. sanctions on Iran, some dating back to the 1979 hostage crisis, remained in effect. They cover matters such as Iran's ballistic missile program, support for terrorist groups, and human rights abuses. Though the United States committed to lifting its sanctions on oil exports, it kept restrictions on financial transactions, which have deterred international trade with Iran.

Weapons embargo. The parties agreed to lift an existing UN ban on Iran's transfer of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles after five years if the IAEA certified that Iran only engaged in civilian nuclear activity.

How is the Iran deal enforced?

If any signatory suspects Iran is violating the deal, the UN Security Council can vote on whether to continue sanctions relief. This “snapback” mechanism remains in effect for ten years, after which the UN sanctions are set to be permanently removed.

In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to snap back sanctions. The other P5 members objected to the move, saying the United States could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the nuclear deal in 2018.

Did Iran comply initially?

The agreement got off to a fairly smooth start. The IAEA certified in early 2016 that Iran had met its preliminary pledges; and the United States, EU, and United Nations responded by repealing or suspending their sanctions. Most significantly, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration dropped secondary sanctions on the oil sector, which allowed Iran to ramp up its oil exports to nearly the level it reached prior to sanctions. The United States and many European nations also unfroze about \$100 billion worth of frozen Iranian assets.

However, the deal has been near collapse since President Trump withdrew the United States from it in 2018 and reinstated devastating banking and oil sanctions. Trump said the agreement failed to address Iran’s ballistic

missile program and its proxy warfare in the region, and he claimed that the sunset provisions would enable Iran to pursue nuclear weapons in the future.

U.S. Relations With Iran

Iran accused the United States of reneging on its commitments, and faulted Europe for submitting to U.S. unilateralism. In a bid to keep the agreement alive, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom launched a barter system known as INSTEX to facilitate transactions with Iran outside of the U.S. banking system. INSTEX was used only once before France and Germany announced its dissolution in 2023, citing Iranian obstruction.

Following the U.S. withdrawal, several countries—U.S. allies among them—continued to import Iranian oil under waivers granted by the Trump administration, and Iran continued to abide by its commitments. But a year later, the United States ended the waivers with the aim of halting Iran’s oil exports completely.

What is Iran’s current nuclear activity?

In response to the other parties’ actions, which Tehran claimed amounted to breaches of the deal, Iran started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium in 2019, and began enriching uranium

to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for weapons). It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility; and enriching uranium at Fordow, which rendered the isotopes produced there unusable for medical purposes.

Source: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal>

Questions that should be answered in the committee:

- 1) Do we really need international partnerships to counter the increase in nuclear weapons?
- 2) How can partnerships can reduce the advent of nuclear weapons?
- 3) What is the best way to dispose of such huge numbers of nuclear weapons or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD'S)
- 4) What are the possible amendments that can be done in NPT keeping the current state in account?
- 5) What are the possible solutions to reduce any further making of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, chemical weapons or WMD's in general?

Other sources that can be used:-

- 1) <https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/95>
- 2) <https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/>
- 3) <https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention>
- 4) <file:///C:/Users/Dell/Downloads/dc20-bgg-ga1.pdf>

