

GLENGAZE MUN | UNSC | 22 SEPTEMBER

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD (UNSC)

Greetings, the leaders of tomorrow!

It is our honour to be nominated as the Executive Board of UNSC at Glengaze MUN 2020. In this one day conference, your aim must be to discover yourself by the power of your words. Your motive should not be winning, instead it should be learning, because if you learn something then you are the actual winner directly or indirectly.

There would be some first timers including various experienced delegates as well. Yes experience matters, but not more than your internal strength! Not more than your determination and your power of words!

At last EB would like you people to be confident enough with your points and focus to provide solutions for the given agenda. So, "let's discover the power of unity!"

Executive Board (UNSC)

Chairperson- Shashwat Puri

Vice Chairperson- Ananya Mukola

For any doubt feel free to ask Chairperson at shashwatpuri6@gmail.com

ABOUT THE COMMITTEE (UNSC)-

The Security Council is the United Nations' most powerful body, with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." Five powerful countries sit as "permanent members" along with ten elected members with two-year terms. Since 1990, the Council has dramatically increased its activity and it now meets in nearly continuous session. It dispatches military operations, imposes sanctions, mandates arms inspections, deploys election monitors and more.

This site presents a useful Introductory Article as well as a wide range of other information. There is material on Membership of Security Council, including a list of current and former Council members, information on Council presidencies and sanctions committees, and information about the often controversial process of Membership Elections. We also present Tables and Charts on the Security Council, including the frequency of its meetings, number of resolutions, etc.

For more information about the committee-<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0>

INDO CHINA CONFLICT

The disputed Sino-Indian border, which stretches some 3,500km (2,175 miles) along some of the world's most rugged terrain, is roiling after soldiers from the two countries clashed violently in the last fortnight. The two militaries remain poised eyeball-to-eyeball in Ladakh - a high-altitude desert of which China claims and controls a 43,000-square-kilometre (16,602-square-mile) chunk.

Decades of negotiations between New Delhi and Beijing have not yielded a solution to their competing claims over 135,000 square kilometres of territory along the border.

Even so, violence of the kind witnessed on June 15, when 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese soldiers died in a brutal clash in the remote Galwan River Valley, is rare.

According to Indian accounts, the impasse began in early May when soldiers from China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), who were engaged in their springtime exercises in Tibet, unexpectedly crossed the de facto border – known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) - and grabbed chunks of unoccupied territory. India's thinly deployed military could only watch, since its springtime manoeuvres had been cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Chinese occupation of Indian-claimed territory and the killing of Indian soldiers are a heavy challenge to Prime Minister Narendra Modi's image, which rests on muscular Hindu nationalism. It exposes Mr Modi to allegations of political misjudgement since he has, over the years, invested personal and political capital into wooing China and befriending its President Xi Jinping. The two have met numerous times, including in two "informal summits" at Wuhan in 2018 and in Chennai, in India, last year. Modi portrayed each of these meetings as heralding a new era of strategic cooperation with China.

His government has been unusually mindful of China's sensitivities, even as it repeatedly opposed India's bids for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the world's export of nuclear

materials. Beijing stalled New Delhi's attempts in the United Nations to have a Pakistan-based radical preacher, Maulana Masood Azhar, designated a global terrorist for 10 years before agreeing to the designation last year. It also ignored India's objections to building a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor through territory claimed by India.

Overlooking all this, New Delhi has avoided criticising Beijing over its heavy-handedness against Taiwan and Hong Kong, brutal crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang, its role in the COVID-19 pandemic, or even the Belt and Road Initiative that tramples on India's territorial claims.

Most significantly, Modi has remained non-committal to blandishments from Washington for India to play a major role alongside the US in deterring Chinese adventurism in the Indo-Pacific region. New Delhi has consistently rebuffed invitations to carry out joint patrols with the US military, and chosen to project military power only in the Indian Ocean, rather than in the contested South China Sea.

Given the government's care not to offend Beijing, India's opposition parties have seized the opportunity to lampoon Modi, who had famously claimed in a 2014 election rally that his "56-inch chest" made him suitable for governing. Now his political rivals are criticising him that his musculature exists only in dealing with Pakistan, but not with China.

Modi is also facing trenchant criticism over inadequately funding the military throughout his six years in power. In the current year, the defence budget has fallen to its lowest level, as a share of GDP, since 1962. That year, debilitated by a decade of dwindling budgets, India's military was traumatically drubbed in a war with China.

Amid a chorus of rising criticism, Modi is downplaying the Chinese intrusions, while publicly announcing that the military was handling matters. There is no word on what demands Beijing has made, if any, in on-going discussions between diplomats of both countries.

If Beijing refuses to vacate the territory it has occupied, or makes impossible demands of India, Modi will be left with few options. In what would be a tectonic shift in global power dynamics, India would probably align openly with the US, enormously boosting the emerging containment of China. While Beijing might regard New Delhi's burgeoning relations with Washington as provocative, and this may have motivated it to teach India a lesson, the outcome would be a strategic debacle for China: Its largest neighbour, India, being pushed into the arms of its superpower adversary, America.

INDO CHINA TRADE RELATIONS POST 2019

Over the course of the last week, India is learned to have worked on a wide range of potential trade actions aimed at stemming the tide of imports from China. It also banned the use of 59 mobile applications of Chinese origin, and barred firms from Asia's largest economy from participating in highway projects and investing in micro, small & medium enterprises.

These deliberations and actions follow the violent face-off in Ladakh between the militaries of the two countries on June 15, that resulted in the death of 20 Indian Army soldiers, and the subsequent public campaign to lessen reliance on Chinese goods.

However, duty increases done in a sporadic manner are “going to be counterproductive, if not accompanied by a proper strategy,” warned former Union Commerce Secretary Rajeev Kher, in an interview. “If your fundamentals of domestic production are skewed, then a duty increase isn’t going to facilitate production,” he said. While calling for targeted production-linked incentive programmes, of the kind that gave a boost to automobile manufacturing in the late 1990s and cellular phone assembly in the 2010s, Kher cautioned against “juvenile reactions” like the delaying of inbound consignments from China at Indian ports, by the Customs Department.

INDO CHINA CLASHES

India skirmishes are part of an ongoing military standoff between China and India. Since 5 May 2020, Chinese and Indian troops have engaged in aggressive melee, face-offs and skirmishes at locations along the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. Additional clashes also took place at locations in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

In late May, Chinese forces objected to Indian road construction in the Galwan River valley. According to Indian sources, melee fighting on 15/16 June 2020 resulted in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers (including an officer) and casualties of 43 Chinese soldiers (including death of an officer). Media reports stated that soldiers were taken captive on both sides and released in the coming few days. On the Indian side ten soldiers were reported to have been taken captive while the Chinese numbers remain unconfirmed. Later Chinese Foreign Ministry and the Indian Army denied any detention of Indian personal. It was only on 25 July that reports of disengagement at Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra emerged. As of 30 July, disengagement remained incomplete at Pangong Tso and at PP 17A Gogra while "complete disengagement and de-escalation" between India and China was remaining. On 30 July the Chinese Ambassador to India said that China favours not clarifying the LAC. A day later reports emerged that the Indian Army will continue enhanced deployment of troops even through winter if the disengagement process was not complete.

TOPICS TO BE COVERED

- 1. INDO CHINA TRADE RELATION**
- 2. INDO CHINA CONFLICT**
- 3. INDO CHINA CONFLICT MULTILATERAL OR BILATRAL**